Belarus-linked APT group GhostWriter targeted Ukrainian organizations with a malware family known as PicassoLoader, used to deliver various malicious payloads.
The Ukrainian Government’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) reported a surge in activity associated with the APT group UAC-0057 (aka GhostWriter) group between July 12 and 18, 2024. Threat actors distributed documents containing macros designed to deploy the PICASSOLOADER malware on victim computers, which then delivered the post-exploitation tool Cobalt Strike Beacon.
The attackers used bait documents related to local government reform (USAID/DAI “HOVERLA” project), taxation, and financial-economic metrics (“oborona.rar,” “66_oborona_PURGED.xls,” “trix.xls,” “equipment_survey_regions_.xls,” “accounts.xls,” “spreadsheet.xls,” “attachment.xls,” “Податок_2024.xls”).
“Based on this, it can be inferred that UAC-0057 might have targeted both project office specialists and their counterparts among the employees of relevant local government bodies in Ukraine.” reads the report published by CERT-UA.
The campaign was likely part of a broader cyber espionage activity against the Ukrainian government.
In November 2021, Mandiant Threat Intelligence researchers linked the Ghostwriter disinformation campaign (aka UNC1151) to the government of Belarus.
In August 2020, security experts from FireEye uncovered a disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting NATO by spreading fake news content on compromised news websites.
According to FireEye, the campaign tracked as GhostWriter, has been ongoing since at least March 2017 and is aligned with Russian security interests.
Unlike other disinformation campaigns, GhostWriter doesn’t spread through social networks, instead, threat actors behind this campaign abused compromised content management systems (CMS) of news websites or spoofed email accounts to disseminate fake news.
The operators behind Ghostwriter targeted Belarusian entities before the 2020 elections, some of the individuals (representatives of the Belarusian opposition) targeted by the nation-state actor were later arrested by the Belarusian government.
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